Fiona :transbian: :autism:<p><a href="https://blahaj.zone/tags/NIST" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#NIST</a> chose <a href="https://blahaj.zone/tags/HQC" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#HQC</a> as their backup KEM and elected not to standardize <a href="https://blahaj.zone/tags/ClassicMcElice" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#ClassicMcElice</a> for now among other reasons pointing to the standardization with <a href="https://blahaj.zone/tags/ISO" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#ISO</a><span>.<br><br>The argument to choose HQC over Bike is a higher confidence in IND-CCA-security of HQC. I cannot comment on whether that is a reasonable assessment, though I have no reason to doubt it, but I can say that in terms of reasons to make a choice this is of course a pretty good one.<br><br>I’m not sure how I think about the decision regarding McElice, but I can to an extend see where they are coming from.<br><br>This means there are now </span><b>9</b><span> post quantum algorithms approved, standardized or chosen for standardization by generally respected organizations:<br><br></span><b>Key Encapsulation Mechanisms</b><span> (“KEMs”):<br><br>* ML-KEM (“Kyber”), based on Lattices, standardized by NIST<br><br>* HQC, based on Codes, chosen for standardization by NIST<br><br>* Classic McElice, based on codes, approved by BSI (de), ANSSI(fr), and NCSC (nl)<br><br>* Frodo, based on lattices, approved by BSI (de), ANSSI(fr), and NCSC (nl)<br><br></span><b>Signatures</b><span>:<br><br>* ML-DSA (“Dilithium”), based on Lattices, standardized by NIST<br><br>* SLH-DSA (“SPHINCS+”), based on hashes, standardized by NIST<br><br>* FN-DSA (“Falcon”), based on lattices, chosen for standardization by NIST<br><br></span><b>Stateful Signatures</b><span>:<br><br>* XMSS, based on hashes, standardized by IEEE<br><br>* LMS, based on hashes, standardized by IEEE<br><br>Overall, this looks like a decent portfolio. Future standardization might add schemes based on multivariate-equations and isogonies, but for now this should do and give us a basis from which we can design more efficient schemes without being to concerned about the entire ground suddenly giving in because one random guy/gal finds a new attack-vector.<br><br></span><a href="https://blahaj.zone/tags/postquantumcryptography" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#postquantumcryptography</a> <a href="https://blahaj.zone/tags/PQC" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#PQC</a> <a href="https://blahaj.zone/tags/PQCrypto" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#PQCrypto</a></p>