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#PQC

1 post1 participant0 posts today
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Frederic Jacobs

Great call to action by Robbie King on finding more useful quantum algorithms.

Billions of euros have been spent on research for advancing the development of quantum computers, but what are they useful for?

As the post-quantum transition progresses, the main incentive for quantum computers is going away.

Robbie claims "The bar for meaningful progress is lower than it might seem, and even incremental advances are valuable.”

quantumfrontiers.com/2025/04/2

#QuantumComputing#PQC
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Fiona :transbian: :autism:

The paper I co-authored (“A Critical Analysis of Deployed Use Cases for Quantum Key Distribution and Comparison with Post-Quantum Cryptography”) was accepted for publication by “EPJ Quantum Technology” today. 😊

You can find the preprint here, Nick will eventually update it with the final changes.

In short: We looked into existing use-cases for #QuantumKeyDistribution and whether they make any sense and did so as a joint team between people with a QKD-background and cryptographers who started out very critical of QKD. (I’m firmly in the latter camp.)

My personal summary (though some of my co-authors won’t share it to this extend): #QKD is bullshit and not useful for practical purposes as it stands.

#crypto #cryptography #cryptology #postquantumcrypto #PQC

IACR logo
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · A Critical Analysis of Deployed Use Cases for Quantum Key Distribution and Comparison with Post-Quantum CryptographyQuantum Key Distribution (QKD) is currently being discussed as a technology to safeguard communication in a future where quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive security evaluation of QKD-based solutions, focusing on real-world use cases sourced from academic literature and industry reports. We analyze these use cases, assess their security and identify the possible advantages of deploying QKD-based solutions. We further compare QKD-based solutions with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), the alternative approach to achieving security when quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems, evaluating their respective suitability for each scenario. Based on this comparative analysis, we critically discuss and comment on which use cases QKD is suited for, considering factors such as implementation complexity, scalability, and long-term security. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the role QKD could play in future cryptographic infrastructures and offer guidance to decision-makers considering the deployment of QKD.
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Jan Schaumann

OpenSSH 10.0 just landed, now completely removing DSA signature support (you've been warned, repeatedly :-) and finite-field diffie-hellman key exchange. It also enables mlkem768x25519-sha256 as the default kex! (#pqc)

The new version string ("OpenSSH_10.0") is also likely to confuse a bunch of stupid scanners that assume anything starting with "OpenSSH_1" is a 1.x version.

openssh.com/txt/release-10.0

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Anton Arapov

OpenSSL is advancing into the quantum era with the upcoming release of OpenSSL 3.5, integrating post-quantum cryptographic algorithms such as ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205). This development ensures enhanced security against emerging quantum computing threats. For an in-depth analysis, refer to the article by Prof Bill Buchanan OBE FRSE: medium.com/asecuritysite-when-

ASecuritySite: When Bob Met Alice · No Excuses: OpenSSL Enters the Quantum Age - ASecuritySite: When Bob Met Alice - MediumBy Prof Bill Buchanan OBE FRSE
#openssl#pqc
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Alexander Hansen Færøy

This is undoubtedly the most promising Post-Quantum TLS deployment situation I have seen for #Tor since we started discussing it more actively in the team. Very exciting!

I hope that OpenSSL 3.5, when released, will make it into #Debian Trixie. That would make deployment of this so much more snappy and easy for the Tor network to upgrade, but that may be dreaming. The timelines here look quite difficult for that to happen, but let's hope.

#cryptography#pqc#pqcrypto
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Alexander Hansen Færøy

Lo and behold, #OpenSSL 3.5 (their upcoming LTS release) will come out here at the beginning of April, and it does indeed support some of these hybrid PQC schemes. Their recent beta2 announcement can be read here: openssl-library.org/post/2025- and their roadmap is at openssl-library.org/roadmap/in

Very excited by this work. Big kudos to the OpenSSL Team here! 🥳🎉 Already planning on giving this a spin with the C implementation of #Tor later this week to see how it goes!

OpenSSL Library · OpenSSL 3.5 Beta Release AnnouncementThe OpenSSL Project is pleased to announce that OpenSSL 3.5 Beta1 pre-release is released and adding significant new functionality to the OpenSSL Library.
#foss#cryptography#pqc
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Jan Schaumann

Out of the top 100K domains, roughly 28K negotiate a quantum safe key exchange.

Almost all of those support both x25519_kyber768 and X25519MLKEM758; only 129 sites support SecP256r1MLKEM768. There are _no_ sites that support pure #PQC via e.g., mlkem768.

The overwhelming majority of sites that support PQC do so by way of Cloudflare. That percentage matches Cloudflare's overall coverage of the top 1M domains.

Pie chart showing share of top 1M domains by hosting provider: 31.6% Cloudflare, 13.1% Amazon AWS, 2.6% Google, 2.3% unknown, 2.2% Hetzner, 2.0% OVHcloud, 2.0% Akamai, 1.4% DigitalOcean
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Fiona :transbian: :autism:

I was just ranting about #QKD in a chat with someone, when I compared quantum-resiliant cryptography with quantum key distribution like this, and noticed that I really like this summary:

If you want to go 500 meter down the street you can either take your bike or call a helicopter to your place, have it hover over your home, climb up a rope ladder, have it fly you those 500 meters and dis-rope.
Both of these get you to your destination, but one of them is faster, cheaper, less complicated, relying on more established infrastructure, scales better and is just about superior in every relevant regard. And it’s not the helicopter/QKD.

#crypto #cryptography #pqc #quantumcryptography #QuantumKeyDistribution
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Fiona :transbian: :autism:

#NIST chose #HQC as their backup KEM and elected not to standardize #ClassicMcElice for now among other reasons pointing to the standardization with #ISO.

The argument to choose HQC over Bike is a higher confidence in IND-CCA-security of HQC. I cannot comment on whether that is a reasonable assessment, though I have no reason to doubt it, but I can say that in terms of reasons to make a choice this is of course a pretty good one.

I’m not sure how I think about the decision regarding McElice, but I can to an extend see where they are coming from.

This means there are now 9 post quantum algorithms approved, standardized or chosen for standardization by generally respected organizations:

Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (“KEMs”):

* ML-KEM (“Kyber”), based on Lattices, standardized by NIST

* HQC, based on Codes, chosen for standardization by NIST

* Classic McElice, based on codes, approved by BSI (de), ANSSI(fr), and NCSC (nl)

* Frodo, based on lattices, approved by BSI (de), ANSSI(fr), and NCSC (nl)

Signatures:

* ML-DSA (“Dilithium”), based on Lattices, standardized by NIST

* SLH-DSA (“SPHINCS+”), based on hashes, standardized by NIST

* FN-DSA (“Falcon”), based on lattices, chosen for standardization by NIST

Stateful Signatures:

* XMSS, based on hashes, standardized by IEEE

* LMS, based on hashes, standardized by IEEE

Overall, this looks like a decent portfolio. Future standardization might add schemes based on multivariate-equations and isogonies, but for now this should do and give us a basis from which we can design more efficient schemes without being to concerned about the entire ground suddenly giving in because one random guy/gal finds a new attack-vector.

#postquantumcryptography #PQC #PQCrypto

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Jan Schaumann

#OpenSSL will get the now standardized post-quantum cryptography algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) in 3.5 (planned release date is 2025-04-08):

openssl-library.org/post/2025-

This will include X25519MLKEM768, and will be enabled and preferred by default:

mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/

OpenSSL Library · OpenSSL 3.5: Upcoming Release AnnouncementThe freeze date for OpenSSL 3.5 Alpha is rapidly approaching. If you have a feature on the planning page, please ensure that your associated PRs are posted, reviewed, and ready to be merged before the include/exclude decision date (Tuesday, February 11, 2025) and merged before the repository freeze date (Tuesday, February 25, 2025). Otherwise, the feature will be postponed until the next release. Important dates Feature branches include/exclude decision date: February 11, 2025 Feature branches merge: February 18, 2025 Repository freeze date: February 25, 2025 Alpha release date: March 11, 2025 Beta release date: March 25, 2025 Release date: April 8, 2025 Current highlights of the feature list planned for 3.
#pqc
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